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Abstract
The attack intensity of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
is increasing every year. Botnets based on internet of things (IOT) de-
vices are now being used to conduct DDoS attacks. The estimation of
direct and indirect economic damages caused by these attacks is a com-
plex problem. One of the indirect damage of a DDoS attack can be on
the market value of the victim firm. In this article we analyze the impact
of 45 different DDoS attack announcements on victim’s stock prices. We
find that previous studies have a mixed conclusion on the impact of DDoS
attack announcements on the victim’s stock price. Hence, in this article
we evaluate this impact using three different approaches and compare the
results. In the first approach, we use the assume the cumulative abnormal
returns to be normally distributed and test the hypothesis that a DDoS
attack announcement has no impact on the victim’s stock price. In the
latter two methods, we do not assume a distribution and use the empirical
distribution of cumulative abnormal returns to test the hypothesis. We
find that the assumption of cumulative abnormal returns being normally
distributed leads to overestimation/underestimation of the impact. Fi-
nally, we analyze the impact of DDoS attack announcement on victim’s
stock price in each of the 45 cases and present our results.
1 Introduction and Background
DDoS attacks are responsible for creating unavailability of online resources
which can lead to both direct and indirect losses [1]. In 2016 the intensity
of DDoS attacks peaked at 1.4 Tb/s. The biggest distributed denial of service
attack targeted the systems operated by DNS provider Dyn [2]. A few months
1The final version of this paper has been published in Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks,
Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications (JoWUA), Volume 8, Number 4.
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later this firm was bought by Oracle [3]. One can only speculate about the
change in the valuation of the firm as it is not publicly traded. In this study
we investigate the impact of DDoS attack announcements on the stock price of
the victim firms.
Figure 1: Impact of a DDoS attack announcement on market valuation of the
firm
The stock price of a firm is representative of its market value. In the past
economists have analyzed the impact of an economic event on the value of
the firm [4]. A strategic business decision e.g. merger or an acquisition can
significantly impact the future dividends. For instance, in the case of a possible
negative impact on the future cash flows, it is beneficial for the investors to sell
the shares and invest in a different stock.
DDoS attacks may lead to negative news articles about the firm. These
news articles come as a negative sentiment shock and can negatively influence
the demand of the victim firm’s shares [5]. This in-turn leads to the fall of stock
prices of the attacked company. Figure 1 shows the conceptual relationship
between DDoS attack events and decrease in market valuation of the victim
firm. It also shows the empirical link that we investigate in this article.
Estimating the impact of cyber security related events is a complex problem
[6, 7]. Several studies have tried to investigate the impact of cyber security
related announcements on the victim stock prices and we discuss the results and
limitations of these studies in Section 2. In this article we use three different
methods for analyzing the impact of these attack announcements on target stock
prices and then discuss and explain the differences in results.
This is an extended version of our study [8] that analyzed the impact of DDoS
attack announcements on victim stock prices. In this article we compare the
method proposed in [8] with the traditional methods of event study and illustrate
the disadvantages of using the assumptions and approximations considered in
those. We also analyze an extended set of DDoS attack announcements and
re-emphasize the results of our previous study.
2
2 Related Literature
Event studies have been used by researchers to study the impact of various firm
related announcements on the stock price. Mackinlay [4] discussed a method of
conducting an event study including the various market estimation models. In
this section we discuss the articles that have contributed to evaluation of the
impact cyber security event announcements have on victim stock prices.
Hovav and D’Arcy [9] used a so-called one-factor market model in order to
estimate the stock prices. Equation 1 shows the estimation model used by them,
where rit represents the return rate of the stock i on day t and rmt represents
the rate of return of the market index on day t. As an example, rit can be
computed as (Pit − Pit−1)/Pit−1, where Pit is the price of the stock on day t.
The parameters αi and βi are firm dependent coefficients and can be estimated
using ordinary least square (OLS). The stochastic variable it is the error term
with E [it] = 0. Hovav and D’Arcy [9] analyzed a sample of 23 announcements
of denial of service attacks and were not able to find any significant impact of
these announcements on the capital market.
rit = αi + βirmt + it (1)
Later, Campbell et al. [10] used the above discussed estimation model to
analyze a sample of 43 announcements of all kinds of cyber attacks. The ab-
normal returns were calculated by them using Equation 2 and the cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) were computed with the use of Equation 3. They
assumed these CARs to be normally distributed and used a Z-statistic to test
their hypothesis (i.e. there was no impact of cyber attack announcements on
victim stock prices) and reported significant negative impact due to information
security breach announcements.
ARit = rit − (αˆi + βˆirmt) (2)
CARn =
n∑
t=−1
ARit (3)
Cavusoglu et al. [11] and Kannan et al. [12] also use the above described
method for analyzing the impact of security breach announcements. The for-
mer concluded that these announcements not only influence the value of the
announcing firms but also the value of their internet security developers. While
the later considered a sample of 102 and reported a decrease of 1.4% in the
market valuation relative to the control group.
Gordon et al. [13] used a so-called three factor Fama-French model [14] for
the estimation. This model estimates the stock price on the basis of company
size, company price-to-book ratio, and market risk, and can be mathematically
represented as shown in Equation 4. SMBt is the difference between the return
on the portfolio of small stocks and the return on the portfolio of large stocks
on day t, and HMLt is the difference between the return on a portfolio of
3
low-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market
stocks on day t. The parameters ai,bi,si and hi are Fama and French three-
factor model estimated firm-dependent coefficients. The stochastic variable it
is the error term with E [it] = 0. [13] reported no significant impact due to
post 9/11 announcements.
rit = ai + birmt + siSMBt + hiHMLt + it (4)
These mixed results motivate us to evaluate the impact of the choice of
model and the underlying assumptions in the study on the final results. Thus,
in this article we evaluate the impact of DDoS attack announcements on victim
stock prices using three different methods and compare their results in Section
4. Section 3 discusses the methodology used by us in this study.
3 Methodology
Figure 2: Methodology for this study.
The methodology used by us can be broadly subdivided in two parts:
1. Data Collection
2. Analysis
In this study we analyze the impact on stock returns using three different meth-
ods. Firstly, we use the event study method employed by many of the previous
articles [9–11]. In the second method, we use an additive market model for the
estimation of return rates and then use the empirical distribution of abnormal
returns by generating random scenarios for analyzing the additive cumulative
abnormal return. In the last method we use the method proposed by us, that
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makes use of a multiplicative model for estimation and later uses multiplicative
cumulative abnormal returns for analysis [8]. Figure 2 illustrates the step by
step process used.
3.1 Data Collection
The data set in this study consists of all DDoS attack announcements made
on the web since December, 2010. The final list of announcements that were
evaluated for this study are shown in Table 1. It also shows the total number
of negative, positive and no impact periods in each case. In total 60 DDoS
attack announcements were considered for this study. We further filter these
announcements on the basis of the following criteria:
• In case of multiple announcements made on consecutive days, the earliest
announcement was considered.
• All announcements in relation with companies that were not publicly
traded at the time attack were removed from the dataset.
• All such announcements that reported DDoS attacks were coupled with
integrity and confidentiality attacks were not considered. This was done
to analyze the impact of DDoS attack announcements in isolation on the
company’s stock price.
The above criterion of filtering is consistent with previous studies [8]. Yahoo!
finance was used in order to collect stock prices for all the firms. We use S&P
500 index values for calculating the market rate (rmt). Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) 500 has been used by many of the previous studies as the index of the
market. Finally, after filtering the initial dataset we analyze a sample of 45
announcements.
3.2 Analysis
For analysis of the data set we first establish the null hypothesis (H0) as follows:
H0: There is no impact of DDoS attack announcements on victim stock prices.
In order to analyze the collected data we first need to calculate the rate of
return of the market index on day t (rmt) and rit the rate of return of the stock
i on day t. The rate of return can be calculated as shown in Equation 5, where
Rit and Rmt represent the stock price and market index for day t. The value of
the market index shows the average of returns of all the firms included in the
market index.
rit =
Rit −Ri(t−1)
Ri(t−1)
rmt =
Rmt −Rm(t−1)
Rm(t−1)
(5)
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In this study we use three different methods to test our null hypothesis (H0).
After explaining in detail these methods in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 we
then compare the results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
3.2.1 Method 1
In the first method we consider an additive model to represent the normal
behavior of the market. The model can be mathematically represented as shown
in Equation 6. This model is used to estimate the returns on a firm’s stock.
The parameters rit and rmt are calculated as shown in Equation 5.
rit = αi + βirmt + it (6)
The stochastic variable it is the error term with E [it] = 0. We use ordinary
least square (OLS) in order to calculate the estimations αˆi and βˆi for the firm
dependent parameters αi and βi by considering daily returns over a period
of 200 days. The estimation period starts 201 days before the date of attack
announcement and ends two days before the announcement.
−201 −1−2 7 91 3 5
Estimation Period
[−201,−2]
[−1, 9]
[−1, 7]
[−1, 1]
[−1, 3]
[−1, 5]
Event Periods
Figure 3: Estimation and Event Periods.
The additive abnormal return (AARit) is the measurement of the deviation
of the actual returns from the ones calculated with the help of additive model
equation 6. Hence AARit can be mathematically represented as:
AARit = rit − (αˆi + βˆirmt) (7)
We measure the impact of DDoS attack announcements on the stock return
over the following five event periods:
1. One day prior to the announcement to 1 days after it [t− 1, t+ 1].
2. One day prior to the announcement to 3 days after it [t− 1, t+ 3].
3. One day prior to the announcement to 5 days after it [t− 1, t+ 5].
4. One day prior to the announcement to 7 days after it [t− 1, t+ 7].
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5. One day prior to the announcement to 9 days after it [t− 1, t+ 9].
We keep these time periods consistent for all methods. The estimation period
and the event periods are shown in Figure 3. We take the event periods from one
day prior to the announcements in order to compensate for any time lags. In
order to calculate the combined effect over a certain number of days, we calculate
the additive cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) as shown in Equation 8 for
the period [N1, N2].
ACARi =
N2∑
t=N1
(AARit) (8)
We compute the mean ACAR for 45 events in our sample as follows:
ACAR =
1
K
K∑
i=1
ACARi (9)
Where K is the number of events. We then estimate the standard deviation
(σACAR) using Equation 10.
σACAR =
√∑K
i=1(ACARi −ACAR)2
K − 1 (10)
Figure 4: Normal distribution for 5 day ACAR values and decision rule for
impact analysis.
We now assume the ACARi values for a given event period to be normally
distributed and test for significance by making use of the Z-statistic at 10%
confidence level. Hence we reject the null hypothesis if the |Z| >= 1.282 as
shown in Figure 4.
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(a) 3-Day ACARActivisionBlizzard (b) 5-Day ACARActivisionBlizzard
(c) 7-Day ACARActivisionBlizzard (d) 9-Day ACARActivisionBlizzard
Figure 5: Empirical distribution of ACAR(additive) for Activision Blizzard
3.2.2 Method 2
In this method we again make use of the additive estimation model as shown
in Equation 6. We avoid the widespread assumption of short-term returns be-
ing approximately normally distributed. We also do not impose any alternative
distribution to these returns. Instead we use the technique of bootstrapping
(e.g. Efron [15]). In this case we generate 5 million n-day returns by randomly
drawing n one-day returns from the empirical distribution. The relative fre-
quencies of these 5 million multi-day returns are then used as the distribution
for hypothesis testing.
In order to calculate the additive abnormal returns we again employ Equa-
tion 7. After computing the AARits for the estimation period and the event
periods as discussed in Section 3.2.1 we draw 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 one-day abnor-
mal returns from the estimation period AARs. We then calculate the value of
ACARi for each of these scenarios with the help of Equation 8. Figure 5 shows
the empirical distribution of ACAR for Activision Blizzard. Lastly, to asses the
effect of DDoS attack announcement on the stock returns we check the position
of ACARi for a certain event period in the empirical distribution of ACAR for
the same number of days of firm i. For example, if we are evaluating the ACAR
of Activision Blizzard for event period [t−1, t+1] then we check the position of
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this ACAR in the 3-day empirical distribution for Activision Blizzard. In this
study we consider the 10 percentile scenarios in the left tail to be representative
of negative impact and 10 percentile scenarios to the right for positive impact.
Hence, if ACARi is negative and lies in the bottom 10 percentile of the 5 million
scenarios then the impact on the stock returns is considered to be negative.
3.2.3 Method 3
In this final method we use a multiplicative model for the estimation of stock
returns. The multiplicative estimation model is shown in Equation 11.
(1 + rit) = αi(1 + rmt)
βi (11)
Also, this time we also deviate from the wide spread practice of adding the
corresponding single-day returns to compute the cumulative returns. Instead
we calculate the exact cumulative returns1.
We linearize Equation 11 as Equation 12. The stochastic variable it repre-
sents the error term with E [it] = 0.
ln(1 + rit) = l̂n(αi) + βˆi ln(1 + rmt) + it (12)
After estimating the stock returns we use Equation 13 for computing the ab-
normal returns. As l̂n(αi) is not an unbiased estimator for αi (E [αˆ] 6= E [el̂nα]),
we use Equation 14 for estimating αˆ.
ARit =
(1 + rit)
αˆi(1 + rmt)βˆi
− 1 (13)
αˆi =
∑T
t=1(1 + rit)∑T
t=1(1 + rmt)
βˆi
, (14)
After computing the ARits for the estimation period and the event periods
as discussed in Section 3.2.1 we draw 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 one-day abnormal returns
from the estimation period ARs. As discussed earlier we then calculate the value
of CARi for each of these scenarios with the help of Equation 15.
CAR =
N2∏
t=N1
(1 +ARit)− 1 (15)
Figure 6 shows the empirical distribution of CAR for Activision Blizzard.
Lastly, to asses the effect of DDoS attack announcements on the stock returns
we check the position of CARi for a certain event period in the empirical dis-
tribution of CAR for the same number of days of firm i. For example, if we are
evaluating the CAR of Activision Blizzard for event period [t− 1, t+ 1] then we
1An increase of 10%, followed by a 10% decrease implies a total decrease of 1% according
to the multiplicative formula (1.1)(0.9) = 0.99. The additive approximation yields a change
of 0%, which is an overestimation of 1%.
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(a) 3-Day CARActivisionBlizzard (b) 5-Day CARActivisionBlizzard
(c) 7-Day CARActivisionBlizzard (d) 9-Day CARActivisionBlizzard
Figure 6: Empirical distribution of CAR(multiplicative) for Activision Blizzard
check the position of this CAR in the 3-day empirical distribution for Activision
Blizzard. In this study we consider the 10 percentile scenarios in the left tail to
be representative of negative impact and 10 percentile scenarios to the right for
positive impact. Hence, if CARi is negative and lies in the bottom 10 percentile
of the 5 million scenarios then the impact on the stock returns is considered to
be negative.
In the next section we discuss the results of our analysis and compare the
results.
4 Results and Discussion
We now compare the results of our analysis. Table 1 summarizes the outcomes
of using the three different methods. The table shows the number of positive
and negative event periods in each case. A negative event periods imply that the
DDoS attack announcement did impact investor decisions. The positive event
periods on the stock price actually show that the stock was well performing and
the DDoS attack announcement did not have any impact on the stock price.
Later in Appendix A we present the impact on each firm analyzed in detail.
First we compare the differences in the results when using Method 2 and
10
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
Company Name Date +ve periods -ve periods No impact +ve periods -ve periods No impact +ve periods -ve periods No impact
Master Card 2010-12-07 2 1 2 2 0 3 2 0 3
Visa 2010-12-07 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
Bank of America 2010-12-27 0 3 2 0 3 2 0 3 2
Vodafone 2011-10-04 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Vivendi 2012-01-18 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Bursa Malaysia 2012-02-13 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Apple 2012-05-25 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 0 5
AT&T 2012-08-15 0 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 4
Wells Fargo 2012-12-19 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
JP Morgan Chase 2013-03-12 0 0 5 3 0 2 3 0 2
TD Canada Trust 2013-03-20 0 0 5 0 1 4 0 1 4
American Express 2013-03-27 0 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 4
ING 2013-04-08 0 3 2 0 2 3 0 2 3
Linkedin 2013-06-20 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 0 5
Microsoft 2013-11-26 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
RBS 2013-12-03 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Electronic Arts 2014-01-02 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
JP Morgan Chase 2014-01-29 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Bank of America 2014-01-29 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Facebook 2014-02-20 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Verizon Communications 2014-03-21 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Activision Blizzard 2014-03-28 1 0 4 2 0 3 2 0 3
Danske Bank 2014-07-09 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Storebrand 2014-07-09 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Gjensidige Forsikr 2014-07-09 0 3 2 0 4 1 0 4 1
Sony 2014-08-22 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Amazon 2014-08-26 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Activision Blizzard 2014-11-13 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
Sony 2014-11-25 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Rackspace 2014-12-19 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Microsoft 2014-12-23 0 0 5 3 0 2 3 0 2
Sony 2014-12-23 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Alibaba 2014-12-24 1 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 5
Nordea Bank 2015-01-09 0 3 2 0 3 2 0 3 2
Facebook 2015-01-26 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Amazon 2015-03-13 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Electronic Arts 2015-03-17 0 4 1 0 1 4 0 1 4
Ziggo (Liberty Global) 2015-08-17 2 0 3 4 0 1 4 0 1
Overstock.com 2015-09-02 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5
Nissan 2016-01-12 1 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 5
HSBC 2016-01-28 3 0 2 3 0 2 3 0 2
Activision Blizzard 2016-08-02 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 0 5
Electronic Arts 2016-08-31 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 0 5
StarHub 2016-10-26 0 0 5 2 0 3 2 0 3
Deutsche Telekom 2016-11-28 0 1 4 0 2 3 0 2 3
Table 1: List of victim companies and summary of results
````````````Method 2
Method 3
+ve No -ve
+ve 24 0 0
No 0 182 0
-ve 0 0 19
Table 2: Cross-table showing the number of differences between Method 2 and
Method 3.
Method 3. Both methods do not take the assumption of normal distribution
for assessing cumulative abnormal returns. However, Method 2 uses an additive
model for estimation and Method 3 uses a multiplicative model for the return
rate estimation. We find no differences between the results of the two models
in the periods analyzed. Hence, we can conclude that the additive model does
provide a good estimation for the computation of cumulative abnormal returns.
Then we look for differences in the results of Method 1 and Method 3. The
differences between the models are as follows:
• Method 1 uses additive estimation model while Method 2 employs the
multiplicative model.
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• Method 1 computes cumulative abnormal returns by adding the succes-
sive abnormal returns where as Method 2 calculates them by using the
multiplicative approach (Equation 15).
• Finally, Method 3 does not assume the abnormal returns or cumulative
abnormal returns to be normally distributed.
````````````Method 1
Method 3
+ve No -ve
+ve 11 3 0
No 13 169 4
-ve 0 10 15
Table 3: Cross-table showing the number of differences between Method 1 and
Method 3.
Table 3 summarizes the differences between the two methods. We believe
that Method 3 is more accurate, or rather less inaccurate, than Method 1 due to
the reduced number of assumptions and approximations in the model. Hence,
look at the number of times Method 1 overestimates or underestimates the
significance of the results, i.e. gives a significant positive or negative impact
when there is no impact or vice-versa. We observe that Method 1 overestimates
the significance of the abnormal returns 5.77% (total 225 periods are considered
in this study) of the times and underestimates it 7.55% of the times. We find
these differences to be consistent between Method 1 and Method 2 as well.
This suggests that the assumption of normally distributes abnormal returns
accounts for these inconsistencies between the results of Method 1 and Method
3 (or Method 2).
5 Conclusion
As an outcome of our study we draw two main conclusions. Firstly, by com-
paring the various methods of conducting event studies we bring out the risk of
overestimating or underestimating the impact of DDoS attack announcements
on victim’s stock prices. The choice of additive or multiplicative model does
not affect the results but the assumption of normally distributed cumulative re-
turns can lead to an incorrect estimation of the impact. Hence, in this study we
propose the use of an empirical distribution in order to check the significance of
cumulative abnormal returns. Secondly, we also re-emphasize on the results of
our previous study [8], and show that all three methods result in a significantly
negative event periods on stock price when service to the customers was ham-
pered due to the attack. We reported that the attacks on ING and Nordea bank
[16, 17] resulted in significant negative returns where as Visa and Mastercard
[18] resulted in no damage. Similarly, in case of the attack on Deutsche Telekom
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that drove nearly 1 million of its customers offline [19], we observe a negative
impact on the stock price in the 9-day and 11-day period.
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A Impact on victim stock prices
Firm Event Period Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Bursa Malaysia 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day -ve No No
5-day No No No
Apple 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Amazon 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Amazon 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day +ve No No
5-day +ve +ve +ve
Activision Blizzard 7-day No No No
9-day -ve -ve -ve
11-day No -ve -ve
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Activision Blizzard 7-day +ve +ve +ve
9-day No No No
11-day No +ve +ve
3-day -ve No No
5-day No No No
Activision Blizzard 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
American Express 7-day No No No
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Firm Event Period Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
9-day No +ve +ve
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Alibaba 7-day +ve No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Bank of America 7-day -ve -ve -ve
9-day -ve -ve -ve
11-day -ve -ve -ve
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Bank of America 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
StarHub 7-day No No No
9-day No +ve +ve
11-day No +ve +ve
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Danske Bank 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Deutsche Telekom 7-day No No No
9-day -ve -ve -ve
11-day No -ve -ve
3-day -ve No No
5-day -ve -ve -ve
Electronic Arts 7-day No No No
9-day -ve No No
11-day -ve No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Electronic Arts 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
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11-day No No No
3-day -ve No No
5-day No No No
Electronic Arts 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Facebook 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Facebook 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day -ve -ve -ve
Gjensidige Forsikr 7-day -ve -ve -ve
9-day -ve -ve -ve
11-day No -ve -ve
3-day No No No
5-day +ve +ve +ve
Activision Blizzard 7-day No No No
9-day +ve +ve +ve
11-day +ve +ve +ve
3-day -ve -ve -ve
5-day -ve No No
ING 7-day -ve -ve -ve
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
JP Morgan Chase 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
JP Morgan Chase 7-day No +ve +ve
9-day No +ve +ve
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11-day No +ve +ve
3-day No No No
5-day +ve +ve +ve
Ziggo (Liberty Global) 7-day +ve +ve +ve
9-day No +ve +ve
11-day No +ve +ve
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Linkedin 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day -ve No No
3-day No No No
5-day -ve No No
Master Card 7-day No No No
9-day +ve +ve +ve
11-day +ve +ve +ve
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Microsoft 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No +ve +ve
Microsoft 7-day No +ve +ve
9-day No +ve +ve
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Nordea Bank 7-day -ve -ve -ve
9-day -ve -ve -ve
11-day -ve -ve -ve
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Nissan 7-day +ve No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Overstock.com 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
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11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Rackspace 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
RBS 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Sony 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Sony 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Sony 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Storebrand 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No +ve +ve
AT&T 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
TD Canada Trust 7-day No No No
9-day No -ve -ve
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11-day No No No
3-day -ve No No
5-day -ve -ve -ve
Visa 7-day No No No
9-day +ve +ve +ve
11-day +ve +ve +ve
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Vivendi 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Vodafone 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Verizon Communications 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
3-day No No No
5-day No No No
Wells Fargo 7-day No No No
9-day No No No
11-day No No No
*The multiple events related to the same firm are sorted date wise.
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